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ABSTRACT

Intellectual property scholars have written extensively against expanding the scope of intellectual
property laws, using social justice and distributive justice principles to support their arguments. A
typical argument attacks broad adoption and enforcement of copyright laws that prevent access to
information and therefore knowledge, or broad patent protection that reduces access to medicines
and other important technologies. In recent years, a few scholars have begun to suggest that certain
areas of intellectual property law-primarily copyright-may play a positive role in social justice.
These arguments are founded on views of social and distributive justice that consider personal
empowerment and freedom to pursue opportunity as viable goals. Very little has been written,
however, on the role of trademark law and publicity rights on development and social justice.
Several factors support examining these issues. Minorities in the United States are far less likely
than non-minorities to seek trademark protection, placing the role of attorneys in assisting
underrepresented populations with intellectual property acquisition into question. Additionally,
social media has made overnight celebrity and personal branding a real possibility for many
individuals, regardless of their socioeconomic status. This article explores the role of trademark and
identity law in promoting self-sufficiency and self-reliance among underserved populations. It
examines both areas of law through the lens of social justice and personal empowerment. It
concludes that a basis in social justice for assisting individuals with acquiring and protecting
trademark and identity rights may overcome the broad societal concerns about over-protection of
intellectual property rights.
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TRADEMARKS, IDENTITY, AND JUSTICE
RITA HEIMES*

INTRODUCTION
A Personal Branding Story
In 2010, Kevin Antoine Dodson, a resident of a housing project in Hunstville,
Alabama, agreed to be interviewed by the local television news after an intruder
entered the home he shared with his sister and her children.' The news broadcasted
quickly and went viral online, as Mr. Dodson's look, style, and unique manner of
speaking attracted the attention of millions of people worldwide. 2 Shortly thereafter,
musicians and humorists calling themselves The Gregory Brothers created a song
known as the "Bed Intruder Song" with an accompanying music video using clips
from the television broadcast. 3 The song was one of the most viewed videos on
YouTube, quickly became a top iTunes download, and even rose to the Billboard
magazine's top 100 list. 4
According to The Gregory Brothers, they agreed to share some of the proceeds
from their song's commercial success with Mr. Dodson.5 Mr. Dodson obviously
acquired instant fame and notoriety." He set up his own website to receive donations
and garner additional publicity, and as a result has purportedly raised enough money
to move his family to a better house in a safer neighborhood. 7
The use-some might say exploitation-of Mr. Dodson's image and voice,
turning his personal name into an overnight household sensation, invokes issues of
trademark and identity law. As discussed infra, it is possible for an individual to
acquire a trademark in his own name provided the name itself is associated with
commercial activities (goods or services). Recent famous examples involve football
players (e.g. Chad Ochocinco) 8 or politicians (Sarah Palin).9 A person's image, voice,
*©CRita Heimes 2011. Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law & Innovation,
University of Maine School of Law. The author would like to thank Andrew Clearwater, Jennifer
Wriggins, Dave Owen, and Sarah Schindler for feedback on earlier drafts of this article. Many
thanks as well to the entire faculty of the University of Maine School of Law for their attentiveness
and suggestions at a faculty workshop featuring this research. Finally, thanks to Lateef Mtima for
his inspiration and leadership in the field of intellectual property and social justice.
1See, e.g., Antoine Dodson, Antoine Dodson Bed Intruder Song, ANTOINEDODSON.NET (Aug. 1,
2010), http://www.antoinedodson.net/.
21d.
3Schmoyoho, Auto-Tune the News: Bed Intruder Song!!! (now on iTunes), YouTUBE (July 31,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMtZfW2z9dw&list=SL&feature=sh-e-top.
See Robert Mackey, 'Bed Intruder'Rant Earns Family a New Home, N.Y. TIMES.COM (August
19, 2010), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/19/bed-intruder-rant-buys-family-a-new-home/.
5
Id.
6 See Dodson, supra note 1 (explaining that Antoine Dodson performed the "Bed Intruder" song
at the BET Awards).
' Id.
8See Official Website of Chad Ochocinco, http://ochocinco.com. (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).

[11:133 2011]

Trademarks, Identity, and Justice

135

likeness, or other characteristics-his "identity" in a persona sense-are also
potentially subject to commodification, as will be explored more fully in Part 1.
Some were offended by the edited images and sounds of Mr. Dodson, who is
African-American, by white musicians who profited by promoting a stereotype of an
undereducated person living in poverty in the projects.10 Others continue to support
Mr. Dodson's celebrity persona, presumably with his encouragement and consent and
to his personal financial advantage."
As individuals' names and likenesses become easier to commodify and
commercialize, potentially to the financial advantage of the individual, what social
and distributive justice issues arise relating to the trademarks and identity rights
involved? How should these issues shape the role of legal service providers assisting
individuals with acquiring and protecting these rights? Is there a case to be made
that economic empowerment is a form of freedom, and assisting with that
empowerment process through the acquisition and enforcement of identity and
trademark rights is a form of justice? This article explores these issues.
Framing Intellectual Property Social Justice Issues Globally
As "western" intellectual property regimes-including laws creating patent,
copyright, and trademark interests-are adopted by developing nations across the
globe,12 scholars have questioned whether the foundations for these forms of property
rights in fact result in the economic development outcomes they purport to
encourage.' 3 They have also questioned whether the acquisition and enforcement of
intellectual property rights, particularly patents and copyrights, does more to harm
individuals-as they seek access to essential medicines or knowledge, for example
than to promote their economic independence.14

9SARAH PALIN, Registration No. 4,005,353.
10See Mackey, supra note 4.

11Id.

12See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
Intellectual property regimes, including
patent, copyright and trademark law, have become more harmonized internationally following
multilateral adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS"),
a result of the 1994 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.
13See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher, Welcoming Remarks: Intellectual Property and Social Justice,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559, 561 (2007).
1 See generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Forward: Is Nozick Kicking Rawls's
Ass? Intellectual Property and Social Justice, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 563, 567-68 (2007) (discussing
competing views of ownership rights as it related to intellectual property); see also Mary W. S.
Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework for Copyright: From Private Property to
Human Rights, 26 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775, 830 (2009) (discussing the commonly-held belief
that the current international IP regime espouses a utilitarian justification, which favors IP
producers in developed Western countries, and should instead incorporate "self-actualization,
freedom of choice, and human development" objectives); William W. Fisher and Talha Syed, Global
Justice inHealthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 UC. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 63940 (2007) (noting that the pharmaceutical industry justifies drug patents on both grounds, arguing
that the social welfare generated by new medicines outweighs the social welfare costs associated
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In recent years, a few scholars have begun to suggest that certain areas of
intellectual property law-primarily copyright-may play a positive role in social
justice. They contend that selecting different rationales for intellectual property
law-apart from strictly utilitarian ones-may assist with social utility and social
justice outcomes.15 They also argue that there is a role for intellectual property
acquisition to help individuals achieve economic independence and personal
empowerment. 16
Little has been written on the role of trademark law on development and social
justice, however, and even less on the role of identity protection as a mechanism for
social justice and personal freedom. Several factors support examining these issues
now. First, minorities in the United States are much less likely than non-minorities
to seek trademark protection from the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO").17 According to the USPTO, "minority owned businesses are seeking
patents at rates almost ten times lower than their non-minority counterparts" and
are "four times less likely to seek trademarks."' 8 These statistics demonstrate that
"some minority groups are not as likely to participate in the U.S. innovation
system."' 9 Minorities may be considered among the marginalized citizens worthy of
consideration for targeted legal services as a form of social and distributive justice in
the field of intellectual property. 20
Partially in direct response to efforts by the USPTO, lawyers are beginning to
offer pro bono services to intellectual property clients, and intellectual property
clinics are emerging at law schools nationwide, indicating that the American legal
community may consider offering low-cost or free counseling in intellectual property
law, including trademark law, to be justified by social responsibility. 21 The right to
prevent commercial exploitation of one's likeness and identity, a property interest
with correspondingly high prices for drugs); JAMES BOYLE, SHAMAN, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS
(Harvard University Press 1996) (discussing concerns about copyright law fencing in information
and knowledge on a global scale).
I' See Madhavi Sunder, IP', 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 313-19 (2006).
16See Lateef Mtima, Copyright Social Utility and Social Justice Interdependence: A Paradigm

for Intellectual Property Empowerment and Digital Entrepreneurship, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 97, 99
(2009).
17David J. Kappos, Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. & Dir. of the U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Office, Remarks as Prepared for the 2010 National Minority Enterprise Development
Week
Conference
(Aug.
26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2010/KapposNational MinorityEnterprise.jsp.
18Id. (noting, however, that these statistics did not apply to companies owned by people
identifying themselves as Asian-American).
19Id.
20See Mtima, supra note 16, at 122-23 (explaining that the "the tragic history of AfricanAmerican and other marginalized members of society being systematically defrauded out of the
commercial profits derived from their creative genius, is widely lamented as a quintessential
example of social injustice within the intellectual property regime").
21See, e.g., John Calvert, Pro Bono Pilot Program in Minn. Helps Independent Inventors Gain
Patent
Counsel,
2
INVENTORS
EYE,
no.
4,
Aug-Sept.
2011,
available at
http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/independent/eye/201108/probono.jsp (discussing how United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") helped launch a "low bono" pilot program in Minneapolis to
encourage intellectual property attorneys to assist independent inventors who are at 300 percent of
the poverty level or below with patent advice and prosecution).
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closely related to and sometimes grounded in trademark law, also merits attention as
an area rife with commercial potential for the individual and yet equally vulnerable
to misuse. This article explores the role of trademark and identity law in promoting
self-sufficiency and self-reliance among underserved populations, and examines both
areas of law through the lens of social justice and personal empowerment.
Part I explains the simple basics of trademark law and right of publicity legal
doctrine, and how the two have merged in certain contexts. Part II examines social
justice themes for trademarks and identity rights as applied not to society at large
but instead to the "marginalized" individual. Part III explores the economic and
philosophical arguments against the expansion of intellectual property regimes, and
in favor of narrow interpretation of IP interests at the individual level, and focuses
on how those arguments play out in trademark and identity law. Part IV concludes
by suggesting that while social justice concerns are clearly challenged by a broadlydefined and enforced trademark system, which allows commodification of identity,
they may be correspondingly served when individuals use these rights for selfexpression and economic empowerment.

I. TRADEMARKS AND IDENTITY AS PROPERTY

A. An Introduction to Trademarks
Trademarks surround us. Commonly referred to as "brand names," trademarks
adorn buildings, billboards, signs, websites, clothing, human flesh- virtually
anything that can convey information. 22 They are symbols-if not drivers-of the age
of consumption in which we live.
Trademarks are governed by the Federal Lanham Act, which defines a
trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by
a person. . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods." 23 Even colors, sounds, smells,
product packaging, or other devices can function as trademarks. 24
To qualify as a trademark, the symbol in question must be sufficiently
distinctive that it can function to identify and distinguish one owner's goods from
those of another. 25 Marks that are not distinctive-usually because they merely
22 See, e.g., JA Apparel Corp., v. Abboud, 682 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (equating
brand names and trademarks).
23 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
A service mark is defined in the same way but refers to services.
Id. For purposes of this article, both types of marks are referred to as trademarks.
21 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1995) (acknowledging that
color can serve as a trademark and noting that when Congress reenacted the Lanham Act in 1988 it
intentionally retained the terms "symbol or device" so as not to preclude the registration of colors,
shapes, sounds, or configurations where they function as trademarks"); see also 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:6 (4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter
MCCARTHY] (listing various source identifiers that can qualify as trademarks in comparison to
patents and copyrights).
25 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 3:1.
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describe the quality or nature of goods in question, the goods' geographic origin, or
the last name of the goods' producer 26-are not inherently distinctive and will fail to
serve as trademarks unless and until they "acquire" source-identifying
distinctiveness.27

In the United States, trademarks are recognized by and protected under
common law, arising out of the broader law of unfair competition. 28 Their function as
a property right begins with their use on and in connection with the sale of goods and
services, and not from a formal registration process. 29 The rights may last
indefinitely, so long as the marks are used consistently and exclusively in connection
with the goods or services.3 0 Nonetheless, registration with the USPTO can confer
valuable rights and advantages, including nationwide protection for the mark,
assistance from the United States Customs Service in preventing importation of
counterfeit goods, and incontestability after five years of registration. 3 ' Registration
remains in force for ten years, 32 but may be renewed repeatedly.33
The test for trademark infringement is whether a competitor's use of a mark "is
likely to cause consumer confusion." 34 This test highlights one key feature of
trademark law that is not found in other forms of intellectual property law like
copyright and patent law: trademark law is designed to protect not just private
property interests but consumers' interests as well.35 Economists William Landes
and Richard Posner have explained how trademark law creates incentives not
necessarily to generate new ideas and expression, but instead to ensure consistent
product and service quality on which consumers can rely.36 Strong and reliable
trademarks lower consumer search costs by allowing "the consumer to say to himself,

26See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e).
Under the Lanham Act, a trademark shall not be refused
registration unless it:
[c]onsists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the
applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, (2) when
used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily
geographically descriptive of them, except as indications of regional origin may be
registrable under section 1054, (3) when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them, (4)
is primarily merely a surname, or (5) comprises any matter that, as a whole, is
functional.
Id.
27 See, e.g., Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific, Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2004)
(explaining that descriptive words can acquire "secondary meaning," or acquire "distinctiveness,"
once the consuming public identifies the mark as a designator of the mark owner's goods or
services).
28See Hanover Star Mill Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
29 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 19:8.
30 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 6:6 (explaining that a trademark's lifetime under common law
is "as long as properly used as a mark").
'3' 15 U.S.C. § 1065.
32 Id. § 1058.
'33 Id. § 1059.
3 Id. § 1114.
Q Id. -

36WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 168 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press. 2003).
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'I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the
trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that
of the brand I enjoyed earlier."'37
Trademarks differ from copyright and patent law in other meaningful ways as
well. Copyright and patent laws in the United States owe their origin to the so-called
"Intellectual Property Clause" of the United States Constitution,3 8 and are
fundamentally based upon utilitarian theories incentivizing the creation of arts and
sciences for the use and benefit of society. Copyright and patent law both create
property rights to capture information that is subject to the public goods problem:
Information is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable-once an idea is shared it cannot be
recovered, and further may be possessed by many simultaneously without
diminishing the enjoyment by any one individual.3 9 If Jill, for example, were to
create a novel invention or write an inventive novel, Jack could make and sell the
same technology or pass off the novel as his own without patents and copyrights to
protect Jill's creative efforts. To encourage creation and publication, therefore,
patent and copyright statutes define property interests in inventions and expressions
that would otherwise be instantly available for all to share without paying the
appropriate rent.40
Trademarks are not public goods. 41 They exist as property rights only to
designate a particular product and (generally speaking) cease to be trademarks once
the goods are no longer for sale. 42 Indeed, trademarks are sometimes criticized as
unworthy of "intellectual property" status because "they do not protect the creation of
additional knowledge; rather they identify the origin of a product." 43 As Landes and
Posner admit, "we do not need trademark protection to be sure of having enough
words, though we may need patent protection to be sure of having enough inventions
or copyright protection to be sure of having enough books, movies and musical
compositions."44
Nonetheless, trademarks serve important economic and social functions beyond
consumer protection and product-quality assurance. The presence of a trademark
37 Id. at 167.
38 U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
31See, e.g., John A. Rothchild, The Social Cost of Technological Protection Measures, 34 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 1181, 1184 n.5 (providing a definition for a nonexcludable good and various views on

what makes a good a "public good").
40See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS xi (Harvard Univ. Press 1996) ("In
market terms, information has significant 'public good' qualities; it is often expensive to create or
generate, but cheap to copy. Economic theory tells us that 'public goods' will be underproduced
because there will be too little incentive to create them.").

41LANDES

& POSNER, supra note 36, at 172.
42Id.
43 KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 48 (Inst. for

Int'l Econ., 2000) (defending trademarks as having social value). Although Maskus questions strong
patent and copyright regimes as appropriate for developing economies, he favors strong trademark
laws, which reduce consumer search costs and encourage firms to improve product quality "in order
not to erode the value of the marks." Id.at 48.
4LANDES & POSNER, supra note 36, at 171.
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law framework in developing nations can provide, again from the view of economics,
"incentives to develop brand recognition for domestically produced high-quality
crafts, clothing and foods, among other goods and services." 45 A frequently cited
example is that of a breed of trademarks known as geographic indications, discussed
more fully in Part III. Geographic indications are a subset of certification marks that
are applied to goods produced in a particular geographic region, such as agricultural
goods, industrial products and handicrafts that are uniquely identified with a people
or place. 46 Because, at least in the United States, trademark protection is associated
with use of the mark as a designation of source for goods or services, their existence
indicates commercial activity and thus entrepreneurship. 47

B. The Modern Expansion of Trademark Rights
The trademark rights commonly accepted today are far greater than at early
common law. This section first explains that the modern expansion of trademark law
is to promote the private property side of the dual property/consumer-protection
function of trademarks. Next, this section discusses recent developments in United
States trademark law in that it recognizes enhanced property interests in
trademarks. Finally, this section describes how the right of privacy tort known as
the right of publicity has grown to overlap with federal trademark law.

1. Dilution and Famous Marks
Long ago, a trademark owner could sue for infringement only if the defendant
was a direct competitor actually passing off (or "palming off') his goods for those of
the plaintiff 48 The rights matched the nature of commerce at the time, when
individual manufacturers of goods were often known personally to their customers. 49
In a pre-industrial economy, "people were personally acquainted with the

45MASKUS, supra note 43, at 179.
46See, e.g., Bernard O'Connor, Sui Generis Protection of Geographic Indications, 9 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 359, 367-68 (2004) (internal citations omitted).

Examples of industrial protected names are Kanchipuram silks and Kolhapuri
Chappal in India, Hereke silk and wool hand-made carpets, Bergama hand-made
carpets, Erzincan copper handicrafts in Turkey, Jablonecka bizuterie (Jablonec
Jewellery), Cesky kristal (Bohemia Crystal), Vamberska krajka in the Czech
Republic, Silk in Thailand, 'Gzhel,' 'Khokhloma,' Vologodskoe Kruzhevo,'
'Zhostovo,' and 'Pavlo Posad Shawls' in Russia.
Id.
U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
48 Gerard N. Magliocca, From Ashes to Fire: Trademark tandCopyright in Transition, 82
N.C.L. REV. 1009, 1014-15 (2004) (discussing the elements of a common law cause of action for
trademark infringement, which required proof that the defendant not only made the same goods
as the plaintiff but also successfully diverted sales by representing that his goods were the
plaintiffs; likelihood of consumer confusion was not enough).
~9Id. at 1015.
4715
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manufacturers of their products. They were the proverbial butcher, baker, and
candlestick maker who lived in the neighborhood." 0
In a post-industrial, information-driven economy, trademarks have acquired
major significance and their scope as property rights have correspondingly
expanded. 5 ' Trademarks may be enforced against non-competitors on the basis that
another's use of a similar (not necessarily identical) mark on related (but not
necessarily the same) goods or services would likely cause consumer confusion. 52
Several courts have added a factor to the infringement analysis that considers
whether "either party may expand his business to compete with the other."5 3 The
USPTO also has a practice of rejecting applications on the grounds that the mark in
the application is too similar to a registered mark used on "complementary" goods, 54
further expanding the registered mark owner's rights through the USPTO's role in
preventing consumer confusion.
Even the likelihood of consumer confusion is no longer a required element for socalled "famous" trademarks to have supreme property value.55
The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA") expanded the scope of rights granted to
marks that qualify as "famous" by permitting their owners to prevent uses of the
mark that may dilute the distinctiveness of the brand.56 Under the FTDA, the owner
of a "famous"5 7 trademark may enjoin anyone who "commences use of a mark. . . in
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the
famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury."5 8
Unlike traditional trademark
infringement law, trademark dilution law is not founded on common law and is not
"motivated by an interest to protect consumers."59

50Id

5t1See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT (Carsten Fink
& Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005) (exploring the development of intellectual property rights, including
trademarks).
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
5 AMF, Inc. v. Sleekeraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir. 1979); see Champion Golf Club Inc.
v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1121-22 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that a positive
finding will weigh in favor of likelihood of confusion, whereas a negative finding has no effect on the
analysis); Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 480-81 (3d Cir. 1994)
(differentiating whether a consumer who purchased plaintiffs peat moss could reasonably assume it
had expanded its product line to include fertilizer).
'4 See, e.g., In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(finding MARTIN'S could not be used by different parties on bread and on cheese products because
of "an extensive pattern of complementary interests: the channels of trade, the types of stores, the
commonality of purchasers, and the conjoint use").
5 See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) (explaining the
removal of the likelihood of confusion requirement for famous marks).
c6See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
5
7Id. § 1125(c)(2) (defining a "famous" mark as one "widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the
mark's owner" and provides several factors for courts to consider).
GB
Id. § 1125(c)(1).
GB
See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429.
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2. Identity Law: Publicity Rights and Section 43 of the Lanham Act
Another emerging form of property right tied exclusively to the individual, and
requiring no formalities for acquisition, is of the right of publicity. Property interests
in one's identity may be enforced through trademark law or the common law right of
publicity.60 Much of the case law developing identity as property stems from claims
brought by entertainment and sports celebrities protecting the value of their image
and brand from claims of misuse. 6 ' In most cases, the celebrities have already
developed commercial value of their likenesses through their success in sports or
entertainment and may even have endorsed other products or services. 62 Yet, as the
Antoine Dodson example illustrates, opportunities to exploit or prevent exploitation
of one's identity may affect those who are not already celebrities before their identity
was exploited.63 Generally, while only the wealthy can afford to litigate publicity
claims, rights of publicity as a legal matter are not necessarily exclusive to those with
pre-existing celebrity status. 64
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, typically invoked for false advertising claims,
may support a publicity-like claim if a plaintiff can establish that consumers are
likely to be deceived or mislead into believing an individual endorses, sponsors, or
approves of another's product or service. 65 Courts have allowed celebrities to sue
under Section 43(a) to "vindicate property rights in their identities against allegedly
misleading commercial use by others."66 The false advertising provision applies to
60See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE
L.J. 383, 387 n.10 (1999) (noting that litigation has been based on common law rights of publicity);
see also PALIN, supra note 9 (exemplifying identity protection through trademark).
61See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992) (alleging false
endorsement under the Lanham Act and misappropriation under California Law voice when famous
singer's voice was imitated in a radio commercial).
62 See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the
defendant would not have even sought a sound-alike if their target voice, the voice of Plaintiff Bette
Midler, did not have value to them).
63 See Dodson, supra note 1.
61J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture-The Human Persona as
Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 134 (1995) ("The
right of publicity protects everyone-both celebrities and non-celebrities. Of course, most of the case
law concerns celebrities because usually, only a celebrity's right of publicity is worth enough to
justify expensive litigation and appeals."); see Haemmerli, supra note 60, at 387 n.10 ("Although
statutory and common law publicity rights generally apply to all, publicity rights, as a practical
matter, usually concern celebrities.").
GParks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003). Section 43(a) provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-(A) is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association or such person with another person, or as to the origin,

sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person. . . shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
66Id.
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celebrities "because they possess an economic interest in their identities akin to that
of a traditional trademark holder."6 To prevail under Section 43(a), a plaintiff must
show that consumers are likely to "believe that the products or services offered by the
parties are affiliated in some way," or that the plaintiff is affiliated with, sponsors, or
approves of the defendant's goods or services.68
Publicity claims may also arise out of state common law (as codified in the
Restatement of Torts),6 9 or state statutes like California Civil Code Section 334470 or
New York's Civil Rights Law.7 ' The Lanham Act has generally proved adequate for
many celebrity plaintiffs, however, and there have been numerous calls for the
federal trademark statute to be amended to incorporate publicity rights more
explicitly. 72
Under some circumstances, unauthorized use of names, alone, has given rise to
successful Section 43(a) and publicity rights claims.7 3 For example, basketball legend
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar successfully sued General Motors Corporation ("GMC")
following GMC's use in a television advertisement of Abdul-Jabbar's birth name,
Ferdinand Lewis ("Lew") Alcindor, together with statistics from Alcindor's college
basketball career at the University of California Los Angeles. 74 Similarly, civil rights

67

Id.

G8Id. at 446 (internal quotation omitted).
69 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 652(C) (1977) ("One who appropriates to his own use
or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy.").
70 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that plaintiff successfully stated a cause of action under common law but not under California Civil
Code Section 3344 where the likeness in question was robot impersonating celebrity).
When a Samsung advertisement depicted a robot wearing a white dress and
blonde wig turning letters as if in a game show, Vanna White prevailed in an
action against Samsung under the Lanham Act, the common law right of
publicity, and California Civil Code Section 3344, which provides, in pertinent
part: "[a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, .. . for purposes of advertising or
selling, ... without such person's prior consent. . . shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof."
Id. In the case of California's statute, courts may find violations of common law, the Lanham Act, or
section 3344, but often not all three at once. Id.; see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,
463-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding common law, but not statutory, cause of action was applicable to
appropriation of famous singer's voice by a voice-impersonator).
71 See, e.g., Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (illustrating how
actor Woody Allen successfully sued under Lanham Act, but failed in his claim based on sections 50
and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law after a movie rental business used a celebrity look-alike
bearing Allen's resemblance in an advertisement).
72 See, e.g., Barbara A. Solomon, Can the Lanham Act Protect Tiger Woods? An Analysis of
Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper Substitute for a Federal Right of Publicity, 94 TRADEMARK REP.
1202, 1208-11 (2004) (summarizing efforts by the International Trademark Association and the
American Bar Association to urge adoption of a federal right of publicity statute).
73 See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar
7 Id. at 1393. This case

v. Gen. Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1996).
involved a GMC television commercial that aired during 1993 NCAA
men's basketball tournament in which 'disembodied voice asks, 'How 'bout some
trivia?' . .. followed by the appearance of a screen bearing the printed words, "You're Talking to the
Champ." Id. The voice then asks, 'Who holds the record for being voted the most outstanding
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icon Rosa Parks enjoined the use of her name as the title of a song by hip-hop music
artists Outkast and their record producer, LaFace Records.75
Trademark law and common law publicity claims also may apply to misuse of
"likenesses" whether look-alike or sound-alike. 76 For instance, famous actor Woody
Allen prevailed under the Lanham Act against a video rental company that used a
celebrity look-alike in its advertising.7 7 Singer Tom Waits, resolutely unwilling to
lease his name or voice for commercial purposes,' 8 recovered damages from FritoLay, Inc. when it imitated his gravelly-sounding voice in a radio commercial for
Doritos brand corn chips. 79 Bette Midler, another award-winning singer, successfully
sued Ford Motor Company and its advertising agency under common law rights of
publicity when the court found the commercial use of a voice imitating Midler's
appropriated her "identity."s0 Similarly, Vanna White, the hostess of the television
game show Wheel of Fortune, did not see the humor in Samsung Electronics' use in a
print advertisement of a robot dressed in a wig and dress, turning large letters. 8 '
The Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment on her right of publicity
and Lanham Act claims, finding White had raised issues of fact regarding
appropriation of her identity and likelihood of consumer confusion regarding her
apparent endorsement of Samsung's products.82
The relevance of protecting identity from misuse is heightened exponentially by
technological advancements in digital communication. Images can be copied from one
location, edited, and reposted to another in myriad new ways-some flattering but
many not-by anonymous Internet users generally beyond the reach of the law.83
player of this tournament?" Id. In the screen appear the printed words, "Lew Alcindor, UCLA, '67,
'68, '69." Id.
75Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 453-54 (6th Cir. 2003). This case involved the use of
the Civil Rights activist, Rosa Parks, name as the title for a song. Id. The court explained that the
song's lyrics "contain[ed] absolutely nothing that could conceivably, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered, explicitly or implicitly, a reference to courage, to sacrifice, to the civil
rights movement or to any other quality with which Rosa Parks is identified." Id. The court further
explained that the song would likely be found as "a flagrant deception on the public regarding the
actual content of the song and the creation of an impression that Rosa Parks . . . had.

.

. approved or

sponsored the use of her name." Id.
76 See Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 616.
77Id. at 632.
7 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992). Tom Waits had a policy, which
he had maintained for over ten years, to not do commercials. In fact, he had rejected numerous
lucrative offers to endorse major products. Importantly, Waits' policy was a public one: in
magazine, radio, and newspaper interviews he had expressed his philosophy that "musical artists
should not do commercials because it detracts from their artistic integrity."
79Id.
80See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Why did the
defendants .. . studiously acquire the services of a sound-alike and instruct her to imitate Midler if
Midler's voice was not of value to them? What they sought was an attribute of Midler's identity.").
81 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992).
82Id. at 1401 (finding that "a reasonable jury, viewing Samsung's robot ad as part of a series
with the same theme, could an intent to persuade consumers that celebrity Vanna White ... was
endorsing Samsung products.").
8r See, Haemmerli, supra note 60, at 389 n.21.
According to Wired News, 'virtual kidnapping' is now a 'hot issue' involving the
purloining of individuals' likenesses with the possibility of their appearing on the
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One of the foundations of the right to privacy-the famous Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis article by that title-was inspired in part by one author's indignation that
the "recent inventions" of instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprises
allowed for publication of private facts. 84 Today, the widespread accessibility and low
publishing costs associated with the Internet have encouraged calls for enhancement
in privacy and publicity laws to better protect the identity of private individuals, and
not just celebrities. 85

II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE THEMES: DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
AND PERSONAL EMPOWERMENT

With the information age came direct and rapid growth of intellectual property
law as a method of defining and controlling major business assets.86 Although
intellectual property law has changed and expanded repeatedly over the past
century, the commodification of information, ideas and even identity has grown
vastly in the so-called information age. 87 In response to the growth of electronic and
global commerce, intellectual property regimes have expanded in geography and in
scope. Scholars have voiced concern that wealthy property owners in the form of
multinational corporate entities will encase valuable goods and knowledge assets in
strong property interests, enforced by powerful governments and over-reaching
property laws, and thereby deprive individuals (and poor people in particular) of such
things as life-saving medicines, or life-altering knowledge and information.88
This section explores those concerns as they are leveled against intellectual
property rights, including trademarks.

Internet 'performing lewd or violent acts.' ... One can readily imagine a public
figure "appearing" in a fake infomercial on the Internet, or a secretly homophobic
actor being made to host a gay men's health telethon. Despite the potentially
informative or charitable nature of such uses, they would still amount to "virtual
kidnapping.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
81Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890).
8, See Jennifer Carpenter, Internet Publication: The Case for an Expanded Right of Publicity
for Non-Celebrities, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 5 (2001); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of
Publicity us. The First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 55
(1994) ("[T]he right of publicity has the potential for safeguarding from unauthorized use any
marketable and publicly recognizable attribute of any individual, regardless of whether that person
is a celebrity.").
8c See, e.g., Jacqueline Lipton, Copyright in the Digital Age:
A Comparative Survey, 27
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 333, 358 (2001) (exemplifying how Copyright law in particular
has grown in its scope of protection in response to global political and market pressures); see also
BOYLE, supra note 40, at 2 ("Information. . . is a central feature of the international economy....
Intellectual property-which stretches beyond 'information' conventionally defined-has become a
major area of international concern.").
87See Lipton, supra note 86, at 358; see also Steven D. Jamar & Lateef Mtima, The Centrality
of Social Justice for an Academic Intellectual PropertyInstitute, 64 S MU L. REV. 101, 102 (2011).
88 See Jamar & Mtima, supra note 87, at 129.
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A. Development Economics and Intellectual Property Law
The conflict over the role of intellectual property law in economic development,
social justice, and culture is often played on the battlefield of economics. The United
States Constitution provides for patent and copyright law as a means to "promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts,"89 almost universally understood to rest on a
utilitarian notion of incentivizing creativity for the benefit of society.90 Economic
analysis of intellectual property dates back at least to the classical economists, 9 ' but
truly flourished beginning in the 1970s. 92 As nations, including the United States,
saw the need to incentivize technological innovation in order to maintain global
competitiveness, the importance of intellectual property grew in the national and
world economy, as did a widespread call for expanded property rights.93 Intellectual
property developers complained of weak intellectual property laws and inconsistent
enforcement standards around the globe, producing evidence of widespread copyright
piracy and trademark infringement, and calling for international standardizing of IP
rights. 94
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS Agreement"), 95 a result of the 1994 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations,
reflects a concern to "reduce distortions and impediments to international
trade . . . taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of

§ 8, cl. 8.
e.g. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 36, at 11 ("Because intellectual property is often
copiable by competitors who have not borne any of the cost of creating the property, there is fear
that without legal protection against copying the incentive to create intellectual property will be
undermined."); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
("The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the "Progress
of Science and useful Arts."); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously:
The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 182-83 (2009) ("[W]ithout
patent grants, too little innovation will occur because the rational inventor will not bother to invent
knowing that she will not be able to recoup the cost of invention."); but see, e.g., Olufunmilayo B.
Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 477, 510
(2007) (arguing that utilitarian rationales for copyright have their place, but can also fail to consider
the "varied economic and noneconomic motives" for acts of creation).
91 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 36, at 1 (citing "brief discussions by Stuart, Bentham, Mill"
and others).
92 Id. at 2.
Landes and Posner acknowledge but do not explore other theories supporting
intellectual property rights, such as Wendy Gordon's arguments in favor of recognizing natural law
theories of intellectual property, and "personhood" theories of property ownership based on German
philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. Id. at 4, nn. 18-19 (citing Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J.
89 U.S. CONST. art. I,
90 See,

1533, 1539 (1993); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2-12 (2d ed. 2000)); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 972-73 (1982) ("Hegel concludes that the person becomes a real self only by

engaging in a property relationship with something external.").
9 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 36, at 2.

04A
M1VASKUS, supra note

43, at 15.
supra note 12; see generally Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS
Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979 (2009) (discussing the TRIPS Agreement).
9B TRIPS,

[11:133 2011]

Trademarks, Identity, and Justice

147

intellectual property rights."96 Theories supporting the adoption by developing
nations of the TRIPS Agreement's standards for intellectual property rights include
the notion that an IP rights regime stimulates domestic innovation by solving the
public goods problem and by encouraging foreign direct investment, which has the
benefit of transferring knowledge into a local economy.97 Of course, even economists
who agree with the utilitarian incentives-basis for encouraging innovation also
recognize that an IP regime that is too strong will impose excess social costs by
preventing access to goods or knowledge.9 8
In parallel to the modern economic rationale for a global IP regime, development
economists emphasized the value of measuring individual wealth and capabilities
instead of focusing exclusively on gross national product or other macro-economic
factors. 99 In his influential work, Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen encourages
development economics to "be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and
the freedoms we enjoy."' 00 He suggests a "different view of poverty," one that is
concerned with the "deprivation of basic capabilities" rather than merely low
income.101 Philosopher Martha Nussbaum further advanced these notions of human
capabilities as the foundation for distributive justice.102 "The basic institution from
which the capability approach begins," she argues, "is that certain human abilities
exert a moral claim that they should be developed." 0 3 William Fisher and Talha
Syed summarize the Sen/Nussbaum approach as follows:
[F]irst, we should determine what 'functionings' are central to a flourishing
human life; next, we should discern what 'capabilities' are necessary to be
96 TRIPS, supra note 12, at Preamble.

97See MASKUS, supra note 43, at 4 ("[G]overnments are increasingly convinced that (1) greater
linkages to globalization processes through access to technology and information are critical to
growth, and (2) stronger IPRs can play an important role in providing that access."); see also
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 2821, 2863
(2006). Chon also points out the flaws to this approach:
Integrating intellectual property standards through TRIPS is supposed to result
in long term economic growth through innovation across all member states, at the
cost of short term decreases in access to goods because of higher prices. For
developing countries, this innovation-driven growth (created primarily through
foreign direct investment and accompanying technology transfer) may be an
abstract or perhaps even non-existent benefit. Firms may not enter into the
poorest countries regardless of the level of intellectual property protection they
offer because no profit is likely to be made where consumers cannot pay.
Id. at 2866 (footnotes omitted).
iS See, e.g., MASKUS,
supra note 43, at 30 ("Because IPRs are incapable of operating so
precisely, they are second-best remedies for the underlying market distortions. Protection might be
too weak, resulting in foregone innovation, or too strong, generating surplus transfers to inventors
and sacrificing benefits from consumer access.").
99 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1999)
(exploring what reasons society may have for wanting more wealth and how those reasons allow it to
do the substantive freedoms that it values).
100Id. at 14.
Id. at 20, 119.
02
1 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH

10i

5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
103Id. at 83.
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able to attain those functionings; and, finally, we should identify and rectify
those differences among people's natural and social situations that create
important deviations from an egalitarian ideal of 'universal basic
capability.'1 04
One measure of development and distributive justice, then, is in the mechanisms
by which opportunities and access to capabilities are made available to all, means by
which inequalities "in the distribution of substantive freedoms and capabilities" are
reduced.105 These freedoms and capabilities could well include property interests in
intangibles such as intellectual property. Access to them could certainly assist with
improved self-help, self-reliance, and self-confidence, the deprivation of which is a
form of poverty.106

A. Economic Opportunity through Intellectual Property
Professors Lateef Mtima and Steven Jamar at Howard University Law School
are among the most outspoken proponents of social justice foundations for
intellectual property law, as well as acquisition of intellectual property by
individuals. In particular, Professor Mtima has argued that the Copyright Act is
founded not just on social equity values, but on social justice ones as well.107 He
contends that access to copyright for marginalized communities is crucial, in
particular in light of the digital environment. 0 8
Mtima acknowledges and explains the "social utility" function of Copyright as
supported by Article 1, Section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution and proceeds to explore
whether, in judicial interpretation and actual practice, the Copyright Act can also
serve a social justice function. 0 9 In arguing for a broader sensitivity among the
bench, bar, and academy to "copyright social justice," Mtima posits that it is first
necessary to appreciate the myriad examples of "copyright social injustice":
For example, the tragic history of African American and other marginalized
members of society being systematically defrauded out of the commercial
profits derived from their creative genius, is widely lamented as a
quintessential example of social injustice within the intellectual property
regime. Often unaware of the opportunities and protections afforded by the
intellectual property law, and sometimes simply lacking the legal or
economic resources to secure and enforce their rights, these artists and
innovators saw their rightful rewards misappropriated by white artists,

101Fisher & Syed, supra note 14, at 639-40.
105See SEN, supra note 99, at 119.
'oo Id. at 20-21.

107See Mtima, supra note 16, at 99-100.

108See id. at 101.
1f0 Id. at 119 ("The fact that the Constitution requires that the copyright law perform

a

function of social utility, however, does not automatically mean that it also work as an engine for
social justice.").
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publishers, entrepreneurs, and promoters, and sometimes even academics
and scholars, all of whom had access to the financial and racial capital
essential to commercial development and exploitation of artistic and
innovative works.110

Among other ills, Mtima notes that systematic deprivation of access to
copyright's economic opportunities can lead marginalized artists not to record their
creative works, and potentially not even to share them, both of which fly in the face
of the purpose of the Copyright Act."' Mtima proposes that in light of the ease with
which artists can now create and share using digital information technologies, the
time is ripe for his so-called "social utility/social justice interdependence" paradigm to
influence the judiciary (and, presumably, the bar).11 2 "[E]quipped with at least a
working knowledge of the applicable intellectual property rights and protections, and
of the intellectual property commoditization system as a whole, the marginalized
amateur creator can negotiate her initial agreements more effectively, or at least
negotiate strategically with respect to future agreements, when her bargaining
position is likely to have improved."" 3 In other words, if artists have knowledge of
copyright, and accessible opportunities to exploit its protections, it follows that they
can fully participate in the social utility outcomes copyright law encourages, which
advances social justice interests as well.
Mtima's principal argument is that the Copyright Act itself is based upon social
justice as well as social utility foundations.114 He notes that one can always apply
copyright law to prevent injustice, but that adequate support resides in the
Intellectual Property Clause itself for copyright law to be a mechanism of social
justice as a matter of constitutional law.115 Actions that prevent institutional
manipulation of copyright law to the detriment of minorities and the poor obviously
advance "copyright social justice and intellectual property empowerment," he writes,
but in addition such actions are "vital to the Constitutional mandate of copyright
social utility."" 6
This argument does not neatly apply to trademarks and publicity/identity law,
however, as such areas of law arise from common law unfair competition doctrines
and not the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution.117 Instead, the best
arguments to support a social justice foundation in trademark and identity law rest
on notions of preventing unfair competition and unjust enrichment.118 These policy
goals for recognizing enforceable publicity rights in persona or identity protect the
individual as effectively as the corporation.
110Id. at 122-23 (internal citations omitted).

III Id. at 127 (calling these outcomes "fixation disincentives" and "artistic xenophobia").
112Id. at 129.
113Id. at 143 (footnote omitted).

ii Id. at 100.
"t

Id. at 128-29.

116

Id.

117 See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.

See Carpenter, supra note 85, at 14 ('This moral argument reflects a basic societal belief
that it is wrong for 'free-riders' or 'parasites' to appropriate (and profit from) another person's hard
work.").
118
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Turning from the foundational to the applied notions of social justice in
intellectual property, and copyright in particular, Professor Mtima and his colleague
Steve Jamar have very recently argued in support of law schools' opportunities (if not
obligations) affirmatively to establish clinical legal education programs designed to
assist disenfranchised and marginalized individuals with acquiring intellectual
property protection." 9 "A principal justification for protecting intellectual property is
to encourage the creation and dissemination of information and knowledge," they
note.120
"[T]he ultimate efficacy of this civic agenda is dependent upon the
pervasiveness of its reach: every citizen should have effective access to both."121
Jamar and Mtima proceed to argue that the social justice obligations of law
schools and lawyers compels their efforts to make opportunities to learn about and
acquire intellectual property, particularly copyrights and patents, available to
everyone.122 In particular, they rely upon the American Bar Association standards
for law school accreditation, which obliges schools to "understand the law as a public
profession calling for the performance of pro bono legal services."123 The Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, moreover, urge lawyers to "devote professional time and
resources and civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all
those who, because of economic or social barriers, cannot afford or secure adequate
legal counsel."124 When these obligations are met in the form of legal assistance
through a law school clinic, pro bono representation by practicing attorneys, or a
combination of the two-the result may be to aid entrepreneurial activity, a key
aspect of individual economic empowerment leading to "social uplift and
advancement of marginalized groups."125
The USPTO supports the acquisition of patents and trademarks by
entrepreneurs, including minorities.126 Undersecretary of Commerce and USPTO
Director David Kappos urges entrepreneurs to pursue patents, which "are
fundamental to successfully launching start-ups and growing small businesses which
create two out of every three American jobs."127 To this end, the USPTO is actively
encouraging patent attorneys to offer pro bono legal services to independent
inventors and small companies that cannot afford the typical cost of filing a patent
application.128 Working with Minnesota law firms in Minneapolis and St. Paul, the
119 See Jamar & Mtima, supra note 87, at 103.
120Id.

Id.
Id. at 104-05.
123 Id. (quoting AM. BAR AsS'N, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
121
122

SCHOOLS viii (2010)).
121Id. (quoting AM. BAR ASS'N, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 6).
125See id. at 120 ("One aspect of empowerment is economic empowerment and one path toward
economic empowerment is entrepreneurship-a path which has long been trod for social uplift and
advancement of marginalized groups.").
126See Kappos, supra note 17 ("The economic security of this country and its minority
communities continues to depend on its ability to innovate. But, the key to economic success lies not

only in innovative product and service development, but in Intellectual Property protection, which
allows innovators to capture value from their creativity.").
127 Id.
128 See, e.g., Press Release, Patterson Thuente Christensen Pedersen, P.A., Minnesota to
Pioneer Pro Bono Patents (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://www.ptslaw.com/news/ProBono.pdf.
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USPTO encouraged a pioneering pilot program to assist low income independent
inventors with patent acquisition. 129 These efforts represent a new trend in viewing
intellectual property law as a potentially appropriate area of pro bono legal services
by the private bar. The USPTO has also launched a pilot initiative to encourage law
school legal clinics to offer patent and trademark services to the public.130 The
program certifies law students to prosecute (file) patent or trademark applications on
behalf of clients under the supervision of a qualified clinical professor or
supervisor.11 The program's purpose is to help law students learn the practical
aspects of practicing before the USPTO. An implied social justice function exists
because of the program's affiliation with law school clinics which tend to serve
populations that are unable to afford private legal services.
In addition to focusing on the pragmatic, functional aspects of individual
attorneys assisting individual entrepreneurs with access to intellectual property
protection, a strong case can be made that normative considerations underlying
intellectual property law can serve social justice functions as well. For instance,
scholars have made the case that intellectual property law may not be exclusivelyor even appropriately-based upon classic, economic "incentives" justifications.132
Instead, many argue that a better rationale is one based on social and cultural
values.133 This view, in the context of development economics in particular, perceives
of intellectual property rights for the poor, marginalized, and/or underserved
populations as a means to fulfill their inherent desire for self-expression and a place
in history.134
[P]oor people's turn to property is surely about economics, but is about
social

and

cultural

values

as

well.

. .

.

[T]he

relationship

between

intellectual property and development goes beyond [Gross Domestic
Product]. People, rich and poor alike, want recognition of their creativity
and contributions to science and culture. This capacity for innovation,
work, and cultural sharing is part of what makes us human.13 5
This conveniently removes the greed factor so prevalent in the utilitarian,
incentives-based perception of IP rights, and replaces it with a culture-generating
and society-enhancing viewpoint that is more palatable to those promoting wider
societal interests. It does not remove the question of balance, of course, between
appropriate protection for the benefit of enhancing culture and over-protection at
culture's expense. Because it remains an "outward looking" perception of intellectual
property's function and purpose, this analysis is not wholly satisfying to those who
Id.
o See Law School Clinical Certification Pilot, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/practitioner/agents/law-school-pilot.jsp#heading-5 (last updated
Oct. 14, 2011).
131Id.
129

132 See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 15, at 299-301 (explaining that the GI Act, for example, was

based on a notion of protecting one's recognition, reputation, tradition, and income).
'ssId.
131

Id.

135

Id. at 301.
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would consider the individual's personal empowerment as a worthy social and
distributive justice goal. Those issues are explored next.

B. Trademarks and Individual Empowerment
Mtima and Jamar focus primarily on copyright law as a vehicle for individual
economic opportunity and, therefore, social justice.' 36 Few scholars have applied this
analysis to trademark law, although as a feature of commercial activity 3 7
trademarks are naturally connected to entrepreneurship and, logically, to personal
empowerment.
Indeed, scholars concerned with trademark law's potential for
overprotection and commodification tend to view "the problem through an outward
normative lens that focuses on economic rights."13 8 These sound "criticisms of the
dangers of legally sanctioned propertization" are, in Professor David Troutt's words,
"rendered weak against individuals" who might choose to commodify their business
marks or their own identity as the law permits.139
Because trademarks and publicity rights can serve as strong personal property
interests, it bears considering, in examination of social and distributive justice
principles, whether there is a justice-based argument to be made for helping
individuals acquire and protect trademarks and publicity rights. In other words, just
as Mtima and others have urged that social justice concerns underlie copyright
protection for creative individuals in marginalized communities, perhaps such
concerns also support providing opportunities for access to trademark and identity
protection for underserved individuals.1 40
Even those who are most concerned that social justice demands a restriction of
the scope and application of intellectual property rights to accommodate the needs of
the poor cite examples of how helping individuals acquire trademarks is itself an act
of social justice.141
In Copenhagen, the artist and activist group Superflex helps developing
country farmers brand their products in the same fashion as large
multinationals, so that these farmers can exploit trademarks in products
they cultivated. These are not merely fringe efforts, tilting at windmills, but
rather practical engagements with real world problems, from increasing
access to medicines and culture to fostering socially useful innovations and
economic development. Nor are these activities necessarily hostile to

136 See Mtima, supra note 16, at 100; Jamar & Mtima, supra note 87, at 102.
137See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006) (illustrating that use in commerce is a requirement

for relief under the Lanham Act).
138 David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual Property,
Commodification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1141, 1173 (2005).
's6 Id. at 1173-74.
110 See Mtima, supra note 16, at 122-23, 151.
in See, e.g., Chander & Sunder, supra note 14, at 567.
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intellectual property; rather, many seek to harness intellectual property for
social ends. 142
A leading example of trademarks as opportunities for empowerment in nations
across the globe is the subset known as "geographic indications."
The French-with Roquefort cheese 43-pioneered
the application of special
marks to designate certain goods of particular geographic origin that could be
protected against infringement by imposters using the same or confusingly similar
"appellations of origin."144 The term and its legal scope proved inadequate on a
global scale, and were thus expanded to be "geographic indications" pursuant to the
TRIPS Agreement.145 Under the TRIPS Agreement, "geographic indications" are
defined as "indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a
Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical
origin."146
Geographic indications ("GIs") have been hailed, in Madhavi Sunder's words, "as
the poor people's intellectual property rights."147 They are well suited to craftspeople,
weavers, farmers, and others who produce goods whose reputation for quality is
based upon their geographical or environmental origin.148
GIs accommodate
collective rights, as might be important to an artisans' association, and they are
relatively inexpensive to acquire.1 49
Under the TRIPS Agreement, however, GIs are not recognized as broadly
applicable property rights.15 0 Instead, Article 22(2) of TRIPS requires interested

112Id.

at 564-65.
supra note 46, at 361 n.7 (citing James T. Ehler, Roquefort Cheese,
FoodReference.com, http://www.foodreference.com/html/froquefortcheese.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2011) ("In 1411 Charles VI of France gave sole rights to the ageing of Roquefort cheese to the village
Roquefort-sur-Soulzon, and all Roquefort still must be aged in the caves there today.").
144 1d. at 360-61.
A protected appellation of origin is the geographical name of a country, region, or
locality, which serves to designate a product originating therein, the quality and
characteristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical
environment, including natural and human factors.' This definition contains
three elements: (1) the appellation must be the geographical name of a country,
region or locality; (2) the appellation of origin must serve to designate a product
originating in the country, region or locality referred to; and (3) a qualitative link
between the product and the geographical area, or in other words, the 'quality and
characteristics' must be due exclusively or essentially to the geographical
environment.
Id. (quoting Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Origin and their International Registration, Oct.
31, 1958, as amended Sept. 28, 1979, art. 2(1)).
11Id. at 362.
116TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 22(1).
147 Sunder, supra note 15, at 301.
113O'Connor,

118Id.
119 Id.

11o See generally Tunisia L. Staten, Geographic Indications Protection Under the TRIPS
Agreement: Uniformity not Extension, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 221, 225-26 (2005)
(exploring the existing TRIPS protection of geographical indications).

[11:133 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

154

parties to pass laws that prevent the use of geographic indications in a manner that
misleads the public as to the true origin of goods or results in unfair competition.151
This puts a burden of proof on those claiming GI rights to demonstrate public
confusion or unfair competition before they can prevail.152 TRIPS does not extend
broad per se exclusions of GI usage except for wine and spirits.153
Still, GIs as a form of trademark protection are one opportunity for historically
poor or disempowered groups to generate a unique brand and potentially advance
themselves economically through trademark law.
This is accomplished on a
collective rather than individual level.154 Indeed, one option that could include a
geographic indicator is a "collective mark," which is a mark used by members of a
cooperative or other organization and may include indications of membership in the
group.155 Another is a "certification mark," which may also include indications of
geography or other signifier of quality, and which may be used by multiple entities or
individuals simultaneously, but which may not be used by the entity that manages
the mark.156 An example would be certification as "Responsibly Harvested" for
I,) Id. at 225; see TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 22(2).
In respect of geographical indications, Members shall provide the legal means for
interested parties to prevent: (a) the use of any means in the designation or
presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question
originates in a geographical area other than the true place of origin in a manner
which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good; (b) any use
which constitutes an act of unfair competition within the meaning of Article 10bis
of the Paris Convention (1967).
Id.

152Staten, supra note 150, at 228.
153TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 23(1).

Each Member shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent use
of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in the
place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying spirits for
spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in
question, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical
indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as 'kind',
'type', style', imitation' or the like.
Id.
15 See Sunder, supra note 15, at 299-301.
155 15

U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). Defining the term "collective mark" as:

a trademark or service mark-(1) used by the members of a cooperative, an

association, or other collective group or organization, or (2) which such
cooperative, association, or other collective group or organization has a bona fide
intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register
established by this chapter, and includes marks indicating membership in a
union, an association, or other organization.
Id.
156

Id. The term "certification mark" is defined as:
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-(1) used by a
person other than its owner, or (2) which its owner has a bona fide intention to

permit a person other than the owner to use in commerce and files an application
to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to certify regional
or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other
characteristics of such person's goods or services or that the work or labor on the
goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization.
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seafood, which could be used by individual fishermen or corporate harvesters alike,
and is administered by a neutral third party.157

C. Publicity Rights and Individual Empowerment
A great deal of scholarship, some of which was explored above, has focused on
how intellectual property laws can be used "defensively" to prevent "psychological
harms from cultural misrepresentation" or other demeaning images of various ethnic
or cultural minorities.15 8 These same laws can assist individuals with acquiring their
own affirmative intellectual property rights by allowing them to claim authorship in
works or trademarks for their wares. 159 Rights in identity or publicity are similarly
valued and deserving of protection.
In her article exploring the conflict between an individual's publicity rights and
society's First Amendment interests, Professor Roberta Rosenthal Kwall
acknowledges the validity of "morally based objections" to another's use-commercial
or otherwise-of one's persona. 60
Some economically-based objections can be
remedied through monetary payment and perhaps injunctive relief.11 But morally
based objections arise when the plaintiffs image or persona is used in a context or
manner that conflicts with the plaintiffs own values and interests.162 Professor
Kwall further describes the fundamental social interests vindicated by the right of
publicity, which include:
"fostering creativity, safeguarding the individual's
enjoyment of the fruits of her labors, preventing consumer deception, and preventing
unjust enrichment."16 3
Much of publicity-rights law, as mentioned above, has been formed through
cases brought by celebrities.164 This leads to a lack of sympathy, generally, for the

Id.

1i See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,139,142 (filed Sept. 27, 2010).
Sunder describes the "politics of recognition" or "identity
politics" as articulated by Charles Taylor.
Taylor eloquently described the emergence of a new paradigm for understanding
equality. Minority groups decried not material deprivation but psychological
injury deriving from demeaning and misleading cultural images expressed in
mainstream media and markets. 'Nonrecognition or misrecognition' of one's
identity, Taylor wrote, "can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning
someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.' Power derives from the
ability to shape and influence culture; inversely, those who do not have power to
create and contest culture 'truly are powerless.'
Id. at 267 (internal citations omitted).
1591d. at 271.
160See Kwall, supra note 85, at 72-73.
161 Id. at 71.
162 1d. at 70-71.
163 Id. at 54.
164 See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting
that famous basketball player, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, brought suit against GM for using his former
name in a television commercial without his consent).
158Sunder, supra note 15, at 270.
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individual whose rights are promoted.165 It has also led, some argue, to a primarily
Lockean view of publicity rights "grounded in labor, rather than persona."i6 6 And it
detracts from the role of consumers themselves in creating the celebrity's own value,
and in establishing the cultural meaning represented by that celebrity's persona or
identity.167

Another view, supported by Alice Haemmerli among others, is a right of
publicity based on Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy of human will and freedom.168
She notes that Kant's system in which "the exercise of human capacity for reason is
an assertion of human freedom ... and the notion of individual control and selfdetermination is fundamental."16 9 Haemmerli finds support for the right of publicity
in Kantian philosophy because "[a]utonomy implies the individual's right to control
the use of her own person, since interference with one's person is a direct
infringement of the innate right of freedom."170 She finds further support for
publicity rights as property rights under Kant's view of property, which "is an
outgrowth of human freedom."171 Because under Kantian philosophy "property is
inseparably associated with one's 'personhood,"' Haemmerli argues that there is "no
logical reason" why one "should not be able to claim a property right in the use of her
objectified identity" and every reason why such claims should take priority over other
people's use of that identity.172
In his fascinating and creative exploration of the limits of trademark and
identity law through the case of an African-American advertising executiveMarCus-seeking to be the first human to trademark himself, Professor Troutt takes
on the critics of and dangers presented by legally sanctioned propertization of
1c' See, e.g., Michael A. Cooper, An Economy in Crisis: Law, Policy, and Morality During the
Recession: Publicity Rights, False Endorsement, and the Effective Protection of Private Property, 33
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 841, 849 (2010) (discussing a trend that wealthier plaintiffs are not getting
the full protection of the rights they have because of their status).
166Haemmerli, supra note 60, at 403. Prof. Haemmerli discusses how courts have "treated the
right of publicity as an economic property right with two variants." Id. at 392. The first relates to
how a person uses her identity for the purpose of selling or promoting goods, e.g. the face on a tshirt, and the other relates to the preventing the appropriation of identity for a commercial
performance. Id. Haemmerli discusses the only U.S. Supreme Court case affirming the right of
publicity, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977), which held that a
human cannonball performer's rights of publicity could be enforced against a television broadcasting
company and that the broadcast company's actions were not immunized by the First Amendment.
Id. at 401. She criticizes the Court for analogizing the right of publicity to copyright and patent law
and using an "incentive-to-creation argument. . . in upholding the right of publicity against a First
Amendment defense." Id. at 401-02.
17 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,
81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 140-41 (1993) (discussing how consumers appropriate products by investing
them with meaning, and how individuals and subcultures "generate or negotiate meanings that
relate to their own experiences and positions" rather than merely accepting what is served up to
them by "the culture industries").
168Haemmerli, supra note 60, at 414.
169Id. at 416.
170UId.
171Id. at 417.
172Id. at 418 ("[Iif one's own image, for example, is treated as an object capably of 'being yours

and mine,' why should it not be claimed by the person who is its natural source? To the extent it is
available as some person's property.").
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identity.173 "These outer-directed critiques do not really reach MarCus's innerdirected bargain."174 Troutt relies on Haemmerli's view of a Kantian system of
personhood to support MarCus's case.175 Acknowledging the dangers of losing the
self to a property right in identity, Troutt and Haemmerli support a "distinction
between an underlying personhood and an outward personality-a self and a
persona."176 Name, voice, and distinctive characteristics can be "things" the injury to
which a court may award relief even while "the internal self' remains separate.177
"Nothing stops us from borrowing the intimation that we have a deeper self
from modernism, while borrowing the freedom to dress up the self in new
personalities from postmodernism."
This should be nothing novel or
difficult for African-Americans, especially those like MarCus who have been
viscerally affected by systematic public condemnations of their external
identities while living inside the "real world" of their more private
humanity. One is rarely ever who one appears to be. But, a person must
choose whether or not to accept that this simultaneous disconnection and
reconnection of self and persona poses no threat to self-identity.178
The philosophical reasons for promoting individual ownership of identity
complement the economic ones, at least from a social justice perspective. One is
morally entitled to self-define and even to commercialize one's own persona. At the
same time, the opportunity to exploit identity for commercial gain-as has Antoine
Dodson, by taking advantage of accidental fame-is one additional opportunity for
empowerment through entrepreneurship. As Professor Kwall asserts, "whatever the
means through which an individual's persona comes to have value, that value should
be attributable to the persona of the publicity plaintiff who has a right to participate
in decisions about how her persona is utilized by others."179 In the social justice
context, supporting these individual interests and values is warranted provided the
broader societal interests in cultural development and freedom of expression are
taken into consideration.
Attacking intellectual property law in the aggregate is similar to considering
economic development in the aggregate; it may overlook individuals' needs and
abilities to improve their own lives. Professor Sunder embraces the "capabilities
approach" described by Sen and Nussbaum as applied to individual acquisition of
intellectual property rights, including trademarks and identity rights.18 0
"Development must entail not only economic growth," he writes, "but also a life that

173 See generally Troutt, supra note 138, at 1172-77 (commenting on the ambiguity of legal
identity).
17 Id. at 1174.
1751d. at 1174-75.
17o Id. at 1175.
177Id. at 1176.
178Id. (quoting Jeffrey Malkan, Stolen Photographs: Personality, Publicity, and Privacy, 75
TEX. L. REV. 779, 781 (1997)).
1(9Kwall, supra note 85, at 55-56.
1so Sunder, supra note 15, at 313-14.
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is culturally fulfilling."181 Intellectual property ownership can be a component in
development on a cultural and economic level. "Recognizing people's humanity
requires acknowledging their production of knowledge of the world. This recognition,
in turn, fuels remuneration to new creators."182
An individual's interests in identity protection should not be lesser than-or
greater than-First Amendment interests or other social and cultural norms law
seeks to foster and protect. They are central to the individual's rights to selfdetermination and freedom. Indeed, although courts are not as likely to recognize for
non-celebrities the powerful publicity rights granted to people like Rosa Parks, there
is no justification under social justice theories to deprive other individuals of the
right to prevent misappropriation of their identities or commercial exploitation by
others. If we are to allow commodification of identity we should give universal access
to such rights. Admittedly, on an aggregate or outward-looking level the increased
commodification of identity does potentially chill speech and restrict other social
values. On an individual level, however, the freedom to acquire, and protect, such
property seems a matter of justice as well. Otherwise, the marginalized-i.e. poor
individual would be deprived of a property interest available under the law.

III. PROCEEDING WITH CAUTION: THE SOCIAL JUSTICE CONCERNS RAISED BY
OVERPROTECTION OF TRADEMARKS AND IDENTITY RIGHTS

Critics of the expanded global IP Regime, among them Margaret Chon, attack
intellectual property's presumed goal of "pure wealth or utility-maximization" as a
measure of social welfare.183
Citing Sen and Nussbaum, Chon argues that
"intellectual property globalization" must be more mindful of and informed by the
human capabilities approach to development.184
"Intellectual property should
include a substantive equality principle, measuring its welfare-generating outcomes
not only by economic growth but also by distributional effects."185 Chon and others
argue that intellectual property regimes, rather than enhance economic opportunities
for the poor, deprive individuals of basic necessities.1 86 These arguments must be
heeded in any analysis of trademarks and identity rights as mechanisms for personal
empowerment.
In other words, although assisting individuals with property
acquisition and using common law rights to prevent exploitation are both supported
under distributive if not social justice theories, the overall scope of these rights as
applied to society's interests in free expression and related rights is not to be ignored.
Trademarks are often not discussed in intellectual property social justice
debates because they do not present property-based barriers to goods or
181Id. at 314.
182 Id

183Chon, supra note 97, at 2831.
184Id.
185Id.

at 2875-77.
at 2823.
186See, e.g., Perschbacher, supra note 13; see also MASKUS, supra note 43, at 6 ("The
international strengthening of IPRs raises concerns that it will reduce the ability of poorer countries
to imitate foreign products and technologies, which would be available only at higher costs,
deteriorating their terms of trade.").
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information. 8 7 Of course, as icons of consumerism, they can drive up the costs of
goods beyond the means of the poor.188 In the academy, moreover, there is a general
normative distaste for things that are "commercial" in nature, as such matters are
"deemed less worthy"189 of various legal defenses such as fair use' 90 or First
Amendment rights.191 Indeed, daily the newspapers tell of consumers misled by
commercial icons lending their names to investments or products-such as when
Donald Trump licensed his name to dubious real estate ventures where individual
investors lost millions,192 or the commodification of national icons like Disney
Entertainment's application to register the mark SEAL TEAM 619 following the raid
on Osama Bin Laden's compound in Pakistan.194 It is difficult to defend trademarks
in a culture so devoted to consumerism.
This section explores the social justice concerns scholars and judges have voiced
regarding the growing scope of trademark and identity property interests, and its
impact on speech, human identity commodification, racial subordination, and even
consumer confusion.

187See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device or
any combination thereof . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods") (emphasis added).
188Troutt, supra note 138, at 1193 ("[M]arket capture raises the price of endorsed or
trademarked merchandise, much of which is popular among teenagers and poor people. Thus,
higher prices reinforce current trends in wealth inequality by filtering more revenue upward while
draining wealth disproportionately from those consumers with the fewest resources.").
189Haemmerli, supra note 60, at 391 n.24.
190See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). One of the factors to be considered in fair use analysis is
whether the use is 'commercial" in nature. See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (noting "every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright," whereas "noncommercial uses are a different matter").
')' See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (internal citations omitted) (explaining "The Constitution. . . accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.").
192 See Michael Barbaro, Buying a Trump Property, or So They Thought, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
2011, at Al, A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/nyregion/feeling-deceived-overhomes-that-were-trump -in-name -only.html?pagewanted=all (discussing how Mr. Trump licensed
his marks to real estate developers and even made personal appearances to "woo buyers" of the
Trump-branded residential and commercial properties). Barbaro notes that many of the projects
were never completed and "buyers lost millions of dollars in deposits even as Mr. Trump pocketed
hefty license fees." Id. at A23.
193 On May 3, 2011, Disney Enterprises, Inc. filed three applications with the USPTO under
section 1(b) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)) seeking to register the mark SEAL TEAM 6 on
various goods, including clothing (Serial No. 85310957); toys, hand-held electronic games, Christmas
stockings, ornaments, and snow globes (Serial No. 85310966); and entertainment and education
services (Serial No. 85310970).
1o See Peter Baker et al., Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at Al,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-iskilled.html?pagewanted all.
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A. First Amendment and the Public Domain
Publicity rights as property rights threaten to shrink the "cultural commons."195
Images of celebrities and others whose images have acquired commercial value
should, according to Professor Madow, be "freely available for use in the creative of
new cultural meanings and social identities, as well as new economic values." 96
Indeed, one of the most impassioned criticisms of intellectual property rights
expansion was by Judge Alex Kozinski dissenting opinion in Vanna White's
trademark and publicity case against Samsung:
Private property, including intellectual property, is essential to our way of
life. It provides an incentive for investment and innovation; it stimulates
the flourishing of our culture; it protects the moral entitlements of people to
the fruits of their labors. But reducing too much to private property can be
bad medicine.

. .

. Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion,

each new creator building on the works of those who came before.
Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.197
In Parks v. LaFace Records, the Sixth Circuit grappled with First Amendment
arguments raised by a hip-hop musical group and its record publisher defending
their use of Rosa Park's name as the title of a song.198 Parks claimed the group
infringed her right of publicity, including creating a likelihood of association or
endorsement confusion under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as well as defamation
of character and interference with an ongoing business relationship. 99 The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants finding the First Amendment
barred Parks's publicity claims and outweighed any potential consumer confusion. 200
The Sixth Circuit reversed. 201 It found that the musicians had made "trademark
use" of the Rosa Parks name, noting "Rosa Parks clearly has a property interest in
her name akin to that of a person holding a trademark" and that defendants' use of
the mark could cause consumers to falsely believe Ms. Parks was affiliated with or
approved of their song. 202 The court then struggled with the appropriate test to apply
in analyzing the defendants' rights under the First Amendment to incorporate names
and other expressive material into their songs. 203
It rejected the traditional

'9

Madow, supra note 167, at 239.

19(Id. at 144-46 ("What it comes down to is that the power to license is the power to

suppress.... [T]he right of publicity] gives her (or her assignee) a substantial measure of power
over the production and circulation of meaning and identity in our society.").
197White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from the order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing en banc) (citing Wendy J. Gordon,
supra note 92, at 1556-57).
198See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003).
I') Parks, 329 F.3d at 443.
200Id. at 444.
201Id. at 463.
202Id. at 447.
203See generally id. at 448-49 (noting that none of the approaches utilized by the lower courts
accord adequate weight to the First Amendment interests in this case).
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"likelihood of confusion" test applied in trademark infringement cases as well as the
"alternative avenues" test under which "a title of an expressive work will not be
protected from a false advertising claim if there are sufficient alternative means for
an artist to convey his or her idea." 204 Instead, the Sixth Circuit adopted the Second
05
Circuit's test from Rogers v. Grimaldi,2
that a title of a song is protected expression
under the First Amendment "unless it 'has no artistic relevance' to the underlying
work, or, if there is artistic relevance, the title 'explicitly misleads as to the source or
content of the work."' 206 Because, apart from the line "move to the back of the bus"
repeated throughout the song, the song otherwise is not intended to be and is not
about Rosa Parks, the court found reasonable persons could find no connection
between the use of Rosa Parks's name in the title and the song itself.207 Further, the
court was clearly unimpressed with the lyrics ("laced with profanity" and "pure
egomania") 208 as expressive content, noting "they contain absolutely nothing that
could conceivably, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered, explicitly or
implicitly, a reference to courage, to sacrifice, to the civil rights movement, or to any
other quality with which Rosa Parks is identified." 209 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit
elevated Rosa Park's name as a trademark above any speech or cultural expression
claims by defendants. 210
When trademarks and identity rights can dominate over artistic freedom, and
leave to judges the tasks of finding "relevance" in the lyrics of modern music or other
art, Judge Kozinski's concerns about overprotection of private property gain
prescience.
As Professor Troutt acknowledges:
[T]he expansion of both trademark and rights of publicity clearly has a
negative effect upon the size and vitality of the public domain. This is
especially true as the culture draws more and broader meanings from
entertainment media, advertising and other forms of popular culture.
Together with an increasingly lax concern for preserving First Amendment
freedoms, courts have allowed intellectual property law to become an
enabler of increased propertization for no consistent reason. 211

201Id.

at 447-48.
205See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
20 Parks, 329 F.3d at 448 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
207 Id. at 453 ("Back of the Bus, for example, ... would not have the marketing power of an icon
of the civil rights movement. Choosing Rosa Parks' [s] name as the title to the song unquestionably
enhanced the song's potential sale to the consuming public.").
208 Id. at 454.
The Sixth Circuit continued to demonstrate impatience for hip-hop music in
later cases as well. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 393 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding DJ Shadow was not entitled to "sample" portions of other sound recordings, no matter how

brief or unrecognizable the sample, without a license from the copyright owner).
209 Id. at 453-54 (noting that the Sixth Circuit condemned Outkast's use of Rosa Parks's name
as merely a "good marketing tool").
210See id.
211 TrOUtt, Supra note 138, at 1192.

[11:133 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

162

By putting image and language control in the hands of celebrities, their estates
or assignees, moreover, critics of expanded publicity rights worry that the rest of
society will be deprived of "our collective cultural heritage and the ability to reflect
upon the historical significance of the celebrity aura."21 2
The valid social justice concerns identified here relate to the ability of members
of American society, at least, to exercise rights in speech and expression that are
embedded in our rich culture and expressly protected in our Constitution. To allow
individual private property interests in words, designs, and names-especially ones
that have acquired universal recognition and thus have inherent expressive
meaning-to chill creativity disserves social and cultural enhancement in the
aggregate.

A. Universal Commodification
As Rosa Parks demonstrates, a claim of misused identity that once would have
struggled to succeed under a tort-like "right of privacy" analysis can now flourish as a
powerful property interest. 213 The case "gave rise to a new asset:
a legally
authenticated commodification of identity, granted at the expense of artistic
freedom." 2 14 As explained above, this raises concerns about society's freedom to use
of names and images to enhance our culture.
Not surprisingly or without
justification, critics worry about the propertization of "each and every thing"
including "commodification of that which is most personal to us:
our very
identity." 215
Beyond threatening society, moreover, the endorsement of human identity
commodification using market rhetoric can also, according to legal philosopher
Margaret Jane Radin, alienate the individual from herself. 216 Radin explores the
extremes of universal commodification and its opposite: declaring certain things
market-inalienable, namely, "outside the marketplace but not outside the realm of
social intercourse." 21 7 She describes situations in which things may be partially
market-inalienable, a sort of sliding-scale into which certain assets may be deemed
commodifiable and saleable in certain circumstances or to a certain degree. 218 Radin
explicitly rejects adopting universal commodification theories with regard to human
219
identity which she regards as "threatening to the notion of "human flourishing."'

212 Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1876 (1991).
213 See Troutt, supra note 138, at 1167-68.
211 Id. at

1172.
215 Sunder, supra note 15, at 275.
216 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1853-54 (1987).
217 Id. at 1853.
218 Id. at 1855-56 ('debates about some kinds of regulation can be seen as contested incomplete
commodification, with the contest being over whether to allow full commodification (a laissez-faire
market regime) or something less").
219 TOUtt, Supra note 138, at 1182.
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Market rhetoric, the rhetoric of alienability of all 'goods,' is also the rhetoric
of alienation of ourselves from what we can be as persons. One way to see
how universal market rhetoric does violence to our conception of human
flourishing is to consider its view of personhood. In our understanding of
personhood we are committed to an ideal of individual uniqueness that does
not cohere with the idea that each person's attributes are fungible, that
they have a monetary equivalent, and that they can be traded off against
those of other people. Universal market rhetoric transforms our world of
concrete persons . . . into a world of disembodied, fungible, attribute-less
entities possessing a wealth of alienable, severable "objects." 220
Radin is also concerned with libertarian notions of freedom. "Commodification of
the person" may wreak "havoc with liberal notions of freedom, justifying marketinalienability of things personal." 22 1
On the other hand, Radin rejects those who would universally deny
commodification on distributive justice grounds. 222 She rightly cautions that, for
instance in the context of tort recovery for loss of consortium or damages to other
values unique to an individual, complete rejection of commodification theories would
"compound the injury to tort victims under the present social structure, in which we
have not put into practice other measures that would take care of them in better
ways or prevent their injuries in the first place." 223
In the end, Radin proposes a "non-ideal" middle ground in which she promotes a
continuum allowing commodification in degrees, depending on context. 224 She
acknowledges that "commodification and human flourishing exist in a moving
context," which provides an opening for property interests in identity under publicity
and trademarks theories. 225
Professor Troutt describes another concern with identity commodification and,
more accurately, the rise of consumerism generally. 226 The legal acknowledgment of
extensive property interests in an individual's identity may cause unintended and
short-sighted market harms to the collective whole. 227 In particular, Troutt warns,
"[m]arket capture raises the price of endorsed or trademarked merchandise, much of
which is popular among teenagers and poor people." 228 If strong property interests in
marks and identity are tied exclusively to celebrities, or expanded to all individuals
whose persona may-even briefly-command commercial value, this may create
higher prices for goods appealing to the least able to afford them, thereby reinforcing

220

Radin, supra note 216, at 1884-85 (internal footnotes omitted).
supra note 138, at 1185 (citing Radin, supra note 216, at 1906).

221 Troutt,

222Radin, supra note 216, at 1869-71.
223

Id. at 1877 (discussing Richard Abel's proposal to replace the tort system with one that

treats people equally).

Id. at 1917_18.
See Troutt, supra note 139, at 1191 (citing Radin, supra note 216, at 1903).
226Id. at 1193.
221

225

227 Id.
228 Id.
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trends in wealth inequality. 229 As social justice is generally concerned with the
rights and capabilities of the poor,230 strong property interests in the marks and
identities associated with consumer goods may be counterproductive.

B. Racial Subordination
The Lanham Act creates a presumption in favor of registration, but creates an
exception for "immoral" or "disparaging" marks. 231 This provision has been cited by
interest groups in attempts to cancel registered trademarks or oppose their
registration in the first place. 232
A well-known example is that of the protracted litigation by members of the
Native American community against the Washington Redskins professional football
team. 233 In Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, seven Native Americans petitioned the United
States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB") to cancel registration of six
REDSKINS trademarks on the grounds they were "impermissibly disparaging
towards members of their ethnic group." 234 The TTAB cancelled the registered marks
containing the word "redskins" on the grounds that a "substantial composite of the
general public" considered it a derogatory term and that it was disparaging to Native
Americans. 235 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed
dismissal of the case on the grounds of laches, based on the plaintiffs' long delay in
bringing the cancellation action, but carefully noted the limits of its decision to the
procedural posture of the case. 236
Generally, the USPTO and the TTAB can be called upon to police offensive
marks and thereby limit or prevent government sanctioning of racial stereotypes. 237
In an examination of social and distributive justice concerns, however, the potential
for marks, symbols and other commercial imagery to offend racial and ethnic (and

229Id. ("[H]igher prices reinforce current trends in wealth inequality by filtering more revenue
upward while draining wealth disproportionately from those consumers with the fewest resources.").
230Chander, supra note 14, at 564 ("Social justice, after all, is generally taken to require
significant obligations towards the poor.").
231 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006) (stating "No trademark ... shall be refused registration on
account of its nature unless it. . . [c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive or scandalous matter,
or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons . . . or national
symbols . . . or bring them into contempt, or disrepute ....

").

See Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
631 (2009).
233 Id.
232

234Id.

235Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1749 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
236Harjo, 565 F.3d at 886. The TTAB had dismissed the laches defense, "finding petitioners
asserted an interest in preventing 'a substantial segment of the population' from being held up 'to
public ridicule,' and that insofar as that interest reached 'beyond the personal interest being
asserted by the present petitioners,' laches was inappropriate." Id. at 882 (quoting Harjo v. Pro
Football Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1828, 1831 (T.T.A.B. 1994)).
237 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MVANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 1203.01 (7th ed. 2010), available at http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/tmep/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
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cultural) groups requires examination of trademark law, on its face a "race-neutral"
legal regime, in the context of potential racial inequality.238
As Professor KJ Greene notes, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act merely prevents
registration of racially derogatory trademarks, but does not prohibit their use. 239
Professor Greene points to several examples in American consumer history where
trademarks reflected, created or exacerbated prevailing racial stereotypes, for
instance describing the "Aunt Jemima" logo as "a smiling 'mammy' type" and "Ratus,
the Cream of Wheat chef' as "a smiling 'coon' type." 240 He cautions that although our
society has made progress in social and race relations, such that marks which
previously would be acceptable are now acknowledged to be offensive and
disparaging, racial stereotypes still play a role in trademarks and advertising. 24 1

C. Consumer Confusion
As previously considered, consumer protection is one function of trademarks. 242
Keeping this aspect of trademark law strong is crucial to one of its social justice
functions, namely, to protect individuals and society at large from being misled,
confused or defrauded. As intellectual property law takes on global dimensions and
the "property" aspects of trademarks grows in significance in the United States and
elsewhere, the potential for trademark law to forget its consumer-protection roots is
magnified.
Indeed, Professor Margaret Chon proposes that public trademark law must be
updated to keep pace with private, market-driven standards. 243 She explains that
industry is self-certifying with little oversight, potentially misleading consumers to
even greater degrees. 244 Just acknowledging the potential for intellectual propertyincluding trademarks-to serve development goals through "grassroots participation,
the inclusion of local knowledge, and flexibility," she expresses concern over
inadequate regulatory participation in the "privatized global neoliberal
framework." 245 Citing the example of "fair trade" coffee certification, Chon notes that
the hype over acquiring such a designation may raise the costs of participation to the
point of excluding the very farmers it was purported to support. 246 Furthermore, as a
certification mark, or a subset thereof such as a geographic indication, acquires

238K.J.

Greene, Trademark Law and Racial Subordination: From Marketing of Stereotypes to

Norms of Authorship, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 431, 433 (2008).
239Id.
2

at 437.
0id. at 436.
21 Iid. at 444.
242See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
213 See generally Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311, 2317 (2009)

(noting that "an updated public law framework for this growing trend towards market-based
regulation seems not only sensible but critically overdue").
211Id. at 2316 ("Currently, consumer trust in certified goods and services can only operate at
the caveat emptor level, because so much of the standard-setting and certification process is beyond
public oversight.").
215Id. at 2341.
216Id. at 2341-44.
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greater value to the producer, it may fail to properly designate the qualities
consumers expect.247 At a minimum, rather than serve to reduce consumer search
costs, specific certification standards may "not [be] available in a form that provides
meaningful shorthand to consumers" forcing them to "engage in a fair amount of
research to compare and contrast the various standards." 248
Consumer confusion can also be a significant feature of publicity rights, when an
individual's name becomes a trademark. 249 When a noteworthy individual lends his
name to a project, as Donald Trump did by licensing the "Trump" brand for real
estate development projects that he personally did not oversee, the consumer can be
misled into costly reliance. 250 In such cases, terms and conditions in contracts will be
used to relieve the trademark licensor of liability, but that does not remove the
general concern that consumers can be encouraged to transfer their own assets to
those who scarcely need more. From a social justice perspective, then, there is a
clear case to be made for enhanced consumer education regarding reliance on marks
and celebrity endorsements.
Finally, in many instances under modern trademark law, the role of consumer
protection is greatly diminished as Congress and the courts accord greater property
value to marks. As discussed above, famous trademarks may be protected from
unauthorized use, even in the absence of consumer confusion. 25 1 Legal commentators
have expressed concern about the "expansion of property rights at the expense of the
public domain" and worry that expansive dilution laws "[stifle] expression, [hamper]
commercial communication or [reduce] competition."252 Indeed, Congress expressly
diverted from trademark's common law roots in passing the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act, 253 recognizing the substantial investment product producers make in
their marks and seeking to ensure that the United States continues to set standards
for "strong worldwide protection of intellectual property." 254 Laws like this put a
thumb on the scale of property interests over broader societal interests- including

27 Id. at 2343-44.
248Id. at 2346.
219 See Barbaro, supra note 192, at Al.
250 Id.
251 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (explaining that dilution may occur "regardless of the
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury").
252Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1030 n.8 (2006) (citing Margaret Jane

Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in
Cyberspace, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1305 n.29 (1998) ("Modern trademark law is moving
. . . towards a ... property rights regime."); Wendy J. Gordon, Symposium Introduction, 108 YALE
L.J. 1611, 1614-15 (1999) (expressing concern about dilution law's ability to undermine comparative
advertising and parody); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75
TEX. L. REV. 873, 900 (1997) (commenting on JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS:
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)) (stating that trademark owners
"are well on their way to owning the exclusive right to pun")).
253
Moseley V. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) ("Unlike traditional
infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law
development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.").
251Long, supra note 252, at 1035 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4).
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freedom of expression and freedom from confusion-and lend fuel to complaints
against intellectual property rights expansion in the social justice context.255

IV. CONCLUSION
Whether one embraces a classic economic theory of intellectual property,
including trademark law, as offering incentives to create, or a social and cultural
rationale as a "broader normative purpose" for IP rights,2 56 there is room for
individual ownership of intellectual property under social justice theories. The most
persuasive of these theories is the "capabilities approach" fostered by Sen and
Nussbaum. 257
This emphasis on individual human capabilities and income
generation as a measurement of development is often cited as a cautionary yellow
flag to those who would insist upon utilitarian notions of intellectual property as a
foundation for economic development in an aggregate sense. 258 The same capabilities
approach, however, can also be used to support the individual's rights to acquire and
protect intellectual property, from patents and copyrights, to trademarks and
identity rights.
There is a way for both views to be right. Scholars insisting that social justice
concerns require restrictions on the global spread of IP rights and that developing
nations should not be forced to adopt a one-size-fits-all Western notion of JP259 pursue
a valid point about the definition and scope of intellectual property as applied to all.
Courts interpreting intellectual property rights must balance the breadth of those
rights against important social goals and values such as freedom of expression and
freedom to create. Those who encourage marginalized individuals to learn about and
take advantage of existing IP regimes, however, are also supported by traditional
social justice themes as they apply to access to justice and universal opportunities for
wealth generation. As property interests presumably blind to the economic or social
status of those who would acquire them, they should be made available to all
regardless of income or ethnicity.
Antoine Dodson, the opening example, is one of many individuals whose sudden
and inadvertent celebrity provided him with economic opportunity. 260 Assisting such
individuals to capture the value of their identity by commercializing it is an act of
distributive justice, and falls as well within Amartya Sen's notions of personal
empowerment as a form of social justice generally. Identity rights by trademark
acquisition, as well as common law publicity rights, can be a fundamental step on the
path to personal financial empowerment.
255Professor Clarisa Long shows, however, that dilution claims are difficult to prove and
increasingly unsuccessful. Id. at. 1052 (showing a decrease in successful dilution claims, number of
injunctions, and even claim filings).
256 See Sunder, supra note 15, at 331-32.
257 See SEN, supra note 99, at 10, 119; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 102, at 88.
258See Sunder, supra note 15, at 313-19.
259See, e.g., Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1344-45 (1996) (discussing the potential for a "onesize-fits-all" global IF regime to cause widespread inequalities in access to information).
260 See Mackey, supra note 4.
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Trademarks can be inexpensive to acquire 261 and are often associated with a
meaningful effort to produce goods or services for sale. They can epitomize the
entrepreneurial efforts of one or more individual undertaking a serious endeavor to
create opportunities for income and self-reliance. Assisting individuals with their
acquisition fulfills a social justice function even if, on an "outward looking" societal
scale, trademarks and identity rights can sometimes be enforced to stifle free
expression, cultural advancement, or the occasional attempt at humor. Nussbaum
states:
Human beings are creatures such that, provided with the right educational
and material support, they can become fully capable of all these human
functions ...... When these capabilities are deprived of the nourishment
that would transform them into the high-level capabilities that figure on
the list, they are fruitless, cut off, in some way but a shadow of themselves.
They are like actors who never get to go on the stage, or a musical score
that is never performed. 262
Martha Nussbaum's description of human capabilities fits well with trademarks
and identity rights. This is not to say that assisting individuals with acquisition of
property interests-and their enforcement against legitimate fair use, free expression
or other worthy endeavor-could not contribute to a large-scale misuse of intellectual
property law to the aggregate demise of other social goals. Nor is this to say that
individuals necessarily benefit in all ways from celebrity status, personal branding,
or otherwise exploiting their own identity for commercial gain. 263 This is simply to
say that it would be unfair and unjust to prevent the least powerful and the most
economically deprived from property acquisition simply because scholars have noted
harms on the societal level. Those issues must be resolved in a way that applies to
all.

261 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2006) (explaining what constitutes as "actual use"); id. § 1051(b)
(2006) (explaining what constitutes as a "bona fide intention to use"). To register a trademark with
the USPTO one completes an electronic form through the Trademark Electronic Application System
("TEAS") at www.uspto.gov/trademarks. The TEAS process is designed to be fairly simple and userfriendly; while legal advice is always recommended, it is not required that an applicant appoint
counsel. Fees range from $275 to $325 for a single classification of goods or services, with an
additional $100 fee required if the applicant files under section 2(b) of the Lanham Act, indicating
an "intent to use" the mark in commerce rather than current, actual use.
262
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HUMAN CAPABILITIES, FEMALE HUMAN BEINGS, IN WOMEN,
CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61, 88 (Martha C. Nussbaum &
Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).
26 Indeed, Antoine Dodson was arrested in April 2011 for marijuana possession, a factor that
may or may not be attributable to his internet fame, but which is known by far more people because
of it. See, e.g., Antoine Dodson Arrested for Marijuana Possession, HUFFINGTONPOST (April 23,
2011),
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/23/antoine-dodson-arrestedmarijuana n_852858.htm1 ("The problem with being a viral star is that everyone knows when you
get in trouble, too.").

